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VALUING EARTH INTRINSICALLY AND 
INSTRUMENTALLY: A THEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
JAME SCHAEFER 
[Philosophers have struggled with value theory as one of the most 
recalcitrant problems for environmental ethics. Theologians can 
benefit from their efforts when retrieving and reworking notions 
about the goodness of creation in patristic and medieval texts, par-
ticularly those by Augustine, John Chrysostom, and Thomas 
Aquinas. This process yields a religiously motivated rationale for 
intrinsic-instrumental valuing of the physical world's constituents 
for themselves, their relationships to one another, and their common 
good that can be relevant, meaningful, and helpful for responding to 
ecological degradation.] 
SINCE THE INCEPTION of environmental philosophy as an academic field, scholars have struggled to construct an adequate theory of valuing 
other species, ecological systems, and the greater biosphere. J. Baird Cal-
licott, a major contributor to this effort, has identified value theory as the 
"central and most recalcitrant problem" for environmental ethics.1 Among 
the important questions with which philosophers have grappled are: (1) 
Should other-than-humans be valued instrumentally as means to human 
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director of an interdisciplinary minor in environmental ethics. Recent publications 
reflect her concentration on theology and the natural sciences: "Reporting Com-
plexity: Science and Religion," in Quoting God: How Media Shape Ideas about 
Religion and Culture, ed. Claire Badaracco (Baylor University Press, 2005), and 
"Environmental Ethics from an Interdisciplinary Perspective," Worldviews: Envi-
ronment, Culture, Religion (Fall 2004). In addition to the texts of several forthcom-
ing lectures, she is also preparing a monograph entitled Catholic Foundations for 
Environmental Ethics (Catholic University of America Press). 
1
 J. Baird Callicott, "Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Eth-
ics," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985) 257-75, at 257. Fifteen years later, he repeated 
this lament: "The intrinsic-value-in-nature question has been, and remains, the 
central and most persistent cluster of problems in theoretical environmental phi-
losophy" ("Introduction" to Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental 
Philosophy [Albany: State University of New York, 1999] 15). 
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ends, as Bryan Nor ton insists2 or intrinsically as ends in themselves, as 
Callicott, Holmes Rolston III, A r n e Naess, and others argue? 3 (2) If non-
human entities are valued intrinsically, does their value originate and per-
sist in them to be discovered by humans, as Rolston argues,4 or is value 
something that humans create and attr ibute to other- than-humans, as Cal-
licott proffers?5 (3) Is one ethic or set of ethics capable of adjudicating 
2
 Bryan G. Norton argues that "an adequate environmental ethic need not be 
non-anthropocentric and that an adequate environmental ethics must not be limited 
to considerations of individual interests" ("Environmental Ethics and Weak 
Anthropocentrism," Environmental Ethics 6 [1984] 131-48, at 141). Also see Nor-
ton, "Why I am Not a Nonanthropocentrist: Callicott and the Failure of Monis-
tic Inherentism," Environmental Ethics 17 (1995) 341-58, in which he coun-
ters Callicott's ecologically centered approach as "especially damaging to the 
cause of a practical environmental philosophy—one that could contribute to real 
world policy discussions and environmental problem solving" and argues for aban-
doning the concept of intrinsic value altogether. In "Intrinsic Value for Pragma-
tists," Environmental Ethics 22 (Spring 2001) 57-75, Ben A. Minteer staunchly 
defends Norton's pragmatism while Laura Westra explains "Why Norton's Ap-
proach is Insufficient for Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 19 (1997) 
279-97. 
3
 For example, see Callicott, "On the Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species," in 
The Preservation of Species, ed. Bryan G. Norton (Princeton: Princeton University, 
1986) 138-72 and "Intrinsic Value in Nature: A Metaethical Analysis," Electronic 
Journal of Analytical Philosophy 3 (Spring 1995) www.phil.indiana.edu/ejap/ 
1995.spring/callicott.abs.html (reprinted in Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in 
Environmental Philosophy, ed. Callicott [Albany: State University of New York, 
1999] 236-61); Holmes Rolston III, "Intrinsic Value in Nature: A Metaethical 
Analysis," in Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in Nature, ed. Rolston 
(Philadelphia: Temple University, 1988); Arne Naess, "A Defense of the Deep 
Ecology Movement," Environmental Ethics 6 (1984) 265-70; Robert Elliot, "In-
trinsic Value, Environmental Obligation and Naturalism," The Monist 75 (1992) 
138-60; and Eugene C. Hargrove, "Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value," The 
Monist 75 (1992) 183-212. 
4
 Holmes Rolston III proffers this position: "To say that something is valuable 
means that it is able to be valued, if and when (human) valuers come along, but it 
has this property whether or not humans (or other valuers) ever arrive" (Environ-
mental Ethics: Duties to and Values in Nature [Philadelphia: Temple University, 
1988] 114). Also see Rolston, "Value in Nature and the Value of Nature," in 
Environmental Ethics: An Anthology (Maiden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2003) 143-53 
where he argues that value in the natural world preexists humans, is located in 
individuals, species, ecosystems and evolutionary processes, and would exist if hu-
mans were to become extinct. See further his chapter entitled "Are Values in 
Nature Subjective or Objective?" in his collection of essays in Philosophy Gone 
Wild (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1989). Also see "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," The 
Monist 75 (1992) 119-37 in which John O'Neill explores three interchangeable ways 
in which "intrinsic value" is used. 
5
 According to J. Baird Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Envi-
ronmental Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York, 1989) 133-34, values 
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conflicts among valued beings, or is a plurality of diverse ethical systems 
required?6 As Claire Palmer explains, each of these questions raises others 
while scholars work toward cogent ways of thinking about valuing other 
species, ecological systems, and the larger biosphere.7 
Theologians can benefit from philosophers' identification and refine-
ment of issues pertaining to the value of other-than-human entities that 
constitute Earth. Philosophical efforts can be particularly helpful to schol-
ars of the world's religions who are striving to develop systematic ways of 
addressing ecological issues from the data of their various traditions. 
A particularly fruitful notion to explore in the Christian tradition is the 
goodness of creation. As demonstrated in this article, thinking about the 
physical world's goodness is deeply embedded in patristic and medieval 
texts by some of Christianity's eminent theologians, including Augustine of 
Hippo (354-430 A.D.), John Chrysostom (347-407), and Thomas Aquinas 
(12257-1274). They suggest a theologically based theory of valuing from 
which broad behavioral norms can be discerned and subsequently re-
worked to reflect our current understanding of the world. From this pro-
cess emerges a religiously motivated rationale for intrinsic-instrumental 
valuing of the physical world's constituents for themselves, for their rela-
tionships to one another, and for their common good. This valuation can be 
depend upon human judgment and, therefore, are subjective. See also his "On the 
Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species," in The Preservation of Species, ed. Bryan G. 
Norton (Princeton: Princeton University, 1986) 138-72, at 142-43, where he argues 
that the "source of all value is human consciousness . . . since no value can in 
principle . . . be altogether independent of a valuing consciousness." Value is "pro-
jected onto natural objects or events by the subjective feelings of observers. If all 
consciousness were annihilated at a stroke, there would be no good and evil, no 
beauty and ugliness, no right and wrong; only impassive phenomena would re-
main." Eugene C. Hargrove counters this classification of valuing in "Weak An-
thropocentric Intrinsic Value," The Monist 75 (1992) 183-207; Hargrove judges 
Callicott's position as "overly subjective" in part because some values are the 
product of cultural evolution that serve as foundations for individuals. 
6
 See J. Baird Callicott, "Moral Monism in Environmental Ethics Defended," 
Journal of Philosophical Research 90 (1994) 51-60; also his "The Case Against 
Moral Pluralism," Environmental Ethics 12 (1990) 99-124. The use of several sys-
tems of ethics to address a range of moral problems is championed by Christopher 
Stone in Earth and Other Ethics: The Case for Moral Pluralism (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1987) and in "Moral Pluralism and the Course of Environmental Ethics," 
Environmental Ethics 10 (1988) 139-54. 
7
 Palmer identifies and summarizes these questions astutely with references to 
pertinent environmental philosophers. See "An Overview of Environmental Eth-
ics," in Environmental Ethics: An Anthology, ed. Andrew Light and Holmes Rol-
ston III (Maiden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2003) 15-37. A cursory search of the scholarly 
literature yields a plethora of articles, anthologies, and monographs on the subject, 
including an entire issue of The Monist 75 (1992). 
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realistic, relevant, and meaningful for Christians who believe that the ul-
timate bestower of value is God. 
In this article, I begin by exploring various teachings about the goodness 
of creation in representative texts by Augustine, Chrysostom, and Aquinas, 
focusing on the goodness of natural beings, gradations of goodness among 
creatures, the greater goodness of the totality of creation, its common good, 
God's valuation of creation, and human valuing. Principles of these teachings 
that appear promising for addressing ecological degradation are identified, 
updated to reflect our current understanding of the world, compared with 
parallel issues that secular philosophers have been addressing, and applied 
to the Everglades ecological system. I conclude with the five basic behav-
ioral norms that constitute the ethics of intrinsic-instrumental valuing. 
THE GOODNESS OF CREATION 
Throughout the patristic and medieval periods, Christian theologians 
taught that God created the universe of many diverse animate and inani-
mate beings, they are all good, they altogether comprise a superlative 
goodness, and they are valued by God. The context of their teachings and 
the nuances of their reflections varied as some theologians responded to 
heresies of their times, others commented on the first but more recent of 
the two stories of creation that appear in Genesis,8 and a few wove their 
understanding of the goodness of creation into systematic treatments of 
God's relationship to the world. All shared a faith perspective that is 
profoundly monotheistic: God is the creator of all natural beings that con-
stitute the universe; each animate and inanimate being has a God-given 
purpose; the entire universe is utterly dependent upon God for its exis-
tence; and, humans are responsible to God for how they function in the world. 
The Goodness of Natural Beings 
For Augustine of Hippo, nothing exists that does not derive its existence 
from God, the "supremely good Creator"9 who created ex nihilo the uni-
8
 Bernard W. Anderson, From Creation to New Creation: Old Testament Per-
spectives (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994). 
9
 Augustine, The Enchiridion: On Faith, Hope, and Love, trans. J. F. Shaw, ed. 
Henry Paolucci (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1961) 10.10 (hereafter cited as En-
chiridion). See also Augustine's The Nature of the Good Against the Manichees (De 
Natura Boni) in Augustine: Earlier Writings, trans, and ed. J. H. S. Burleigh, Library 
of Christian Classics (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953) 1.326 (hereafter cited as 
Nature of the Good). He continues in Enchiridion 10: "By the trinity, thus su-
premely and equally and unchangeably good, all things were created; and these are 
not supremely and equally and unchangeably good, but yet they are good, even 
taken separately." 
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verse of "good things, both great and small, celestial and terrestrial, spiri-
tual and corporeal."10 Some people do not understand that every natural 
being is good, he wrote against his former companions, the Manichees, but 
"Catholic Christians" recognize that there are "generic good things to be 
found in all that God has created, whether spirit or body."11 Comparing the 
body of a human with the body of an ape, he concluded that each has its 
own characteristics according to its nature and, accordingly, both are 
good.12 The expansiveness of his valuation is exemplified in The Trinity 
where he declared: 
[T]he earth is good by the height of its mountains, the moderate elevation of its 
hills, and the evenness of its fields; and good is the farm that is pleasant and fertile; 
and good is the house that is arranged throughout in symmetrical proportions and 
is spacious and bright; and good are the animals, animate bodies; and good is the 
mild and salubrious air; and good is the food that is pleasant and conducive to 
health; and good is health without pains and weariness; and good is the counte-
nance of man with regular features, a cheerful expression, and a glowing color; and 
good is the soul of a friend with the sweetness of concord and the fidelity of love; 
and good is the just man; and good are riches because they readily assist us; and 
good is the heaven with its own sun, moon, and stars.13 
Even if a body is diminished and loses its beauty, it is good, he insisted, 
because it exists.14 
Reflecting on Genesis 1, Chrysostom dwelt on the inspired author's 
depiction of God's valuing each type of creature as "good." When God 
declared that creatures are good, the gifted preacher argued, "who would 
dare, even if bursting with arrogant folly, to open his mouth and gainsay 
the words uttered by God?" He identified creatures that are both benefi-
cial and harmful to humans: 
Among the growth springing up from the earth it was not only plants that are useful 
but also those that are harmful, and not only trees that bear fruit but also those that 
bear none; and not only tame animals but also wild and unruly ones. Among the 
creatures emerging from the waters it was not only fish but also sea monsters and 
10
 Augustine, Nature of the Good 3.326. 
11
 Ibid. 3.327. 12 Ibid. 14.330; see also 17.330-31. 
13
 Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna, C.SS.R. (Washington: 
Catholic University of America, 1963) 8.247-52. 
14
 Augustine, Nature of the Good 4.327; 15 and 17.330 where he used the concepts 
of goodness and existence interchangeably. In Nature of the Good 6.328, he wrote: 
"[A]ny nature which can be corrupted has some good in it, for corruption could not 
harm it except by taking away or diminishing what is good in it." He continued his 
thinking in The Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. John K. Ryan (Garden City: 
Image, 1960) 7, chap. 12.18 (hereafter cited as Confessions) that those who are 
suffering corruption are nevertheless good, while beings deprived of all good cease 
to exist. 
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other fierce creatures. It was not only inhabited land but also the unpeopled; not 
only level plains but also mountains and woods. Among birds it was not only tame 
ones and those suitable for our food but also wild and unclean ones, hawks and 
vultures and many others of that kind. Among the creatures produced from the 
earth it was not only tame animals but also snakes, vipers, serpents, lions and 
leopards. In the sky it was not only showers and kindly breezes but also hail and 
snow.15 
According to Chrysostom, anyone who found fault with these creatures or 
inquired in any disparaging way about their purpose or use would be 
showing ingratitude to their Creator.16 
Aquinas consistently stressed the goodness of the physical world, as 
Josef Pieper and others have aptly demonstrated.17 Like Augustine, 
Aquinas pointed to the story of creation in Genesis 1 to affirm the good-
ness of each type of creature,18 and he reasoned to their goodness from 
their existence which he attributed ultimately to God.19 Going beyond 
15
 Saint John Chrysostom, Homilies on Genesis 1-17, trans. Robert C. Hill, 
Fathers of the Church 74 (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1986) 
Homily 10.12, 135-37. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Joseph Piper, "Of the Goodness of the World," Orate Fratres 25 (1951) 433-37. 
According to Piper, Aquinas's summation omne ens est bonum is "the deepest, 
profoundest meaning and root of all those sentences is that every being as being is 
intended and even loved by the Creator, that every creature at the same time 
receives its being-real and its being-loved" (433-34). On initial ethical implications 
of Aquinas's thinking about the goodness of creatures in relation to the physical 
environment, Jean Porter contends astutely that the legitimacy of humanity's use of 
"the subhuman creation" for its own well-being would have to be acknowledged if 
the thomistic framework of thinking were brought to bear on the ecological crisis. 
She cautions, however, that the right to use other created things does not mean that 
humans may treat the rest of corporeal creation in any way they desire, and she 
offers two parameters from Aquinas's thinking within which the human use of 
creation would fall: (1) Any use of the rest of the created world would have to be 
directed to the good of all humanity; and, (2) all created things possess "an intrinsic 
goodness apart from their potential usefulness to anything else" which requires 
"some form of respect" {The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for 
Christian Ethics [Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1990] 178). Also see James F. 
Keenan, "Goodness and Rightness in Aquinas's Summa Theologiae," The Thomist 
58 (1994) 342-48. 
18
 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans, by English Dominicans (Lon-
don: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, 1912-36; repr. New York: Benziger 1947-48; 
repr. New York: Christian Classics, 1981), in The Collected Works of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Past Masters Electronic Resource (Charlottesville, Virg.: InteLex, 1993) 
1, q. 47, a. 2. 
1
 For example, see St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. English 
Dominicans (London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, 1934) in The Collected 
Works of St. Thomas Aquinas, Past Masters Electronic Resource (Charlottesville, 
Virg.: InteLex, 1993) 3, chap. 7; and Summa theologiae 1, q. 60, a. 1, ad 3. 
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Augustine's interchange of goodness and existence, Aquinas depicted each 
entity as perfect in some innate way specified by God. Each is endowed 
with a way of existing and, if animate, a way of acting according to its 
nature. To criticize a creature's nature or its natural inclination is, he 
insisted, an insult to the Creator of nature.20 
For Aquinas, another dimension of goodness is its likeness to God's 
goodness through its innate way of existing as determined by God.21 The 
human is distinct among creatures, however, since the human also bears an 
image of God through the ability to comprehend.22 Only the intellectual 
aspects of the human bear God's image, however, while the nonintellectual 
aspects of the physical body retain only a likeness of God's goodness by its 
existence.23 
Augustine, Chrysostom, and Aquinas ascribed to the intrinsic valuing of 
all types of creatures as distinct entities that are essential to the world. As 
Kavanaugh notes from Aquinas's thinking, this intrinsic goodness and 
value persists regardless of its role as a function of human happiness.24 
Creatures are not islands in the scheme of the world's functioning accord-
20
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 60, a. 1, ad 3; see further 1, q. 103, a. 7, ad 1; 
2-2, q. 23, a. 8, and q. 47, a. 1, ad 1. Also see Saint Thomas Aquinas, On Charity (De 
Caritate), trans. Lottie H. Kendzierski (Milwaukee: Marquette University, 1960) in 
The Collected Works of St. Thomas Aquinas, Past Masters Electronic Resource 
(Charlottesville, Virg.: InteLex, 1993) 3 (hereafter cited as On Charity); Summa 
contra gentiles 3, chap.12; and The Disputed Questions on Truth, trans. James V. 
McGlynn, S.J., in The Collected Works of St Thomas Aquinas, Past Masters Elec-
tronic Resource (Charlottesville, Virg.: InteLex, 1993) 2, q. 16, a. 2 (hereafter cited 
as On Truth). 
21
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 2, chap. 46. That a created being achieves a 
participated likeness of the divine also surfaces in St. Thomas Aquinas, Compen-
dium of Theology, trans. Cyril Vollert (St. Louis: Herder, 1947) in The Collected 
Works of St Thomas Aquinas, Past Masters Electronic Resource (Charlottesville, 
Virg.: InteLex, 1993) 103 (hereafter cited as Compendium of Theology) where he 
explains that the divine goodness is not only the end of the creature but is also the 
end of every operation of any creature insofar as each has some participated like-
ness to the divine goodness. See further Summa theologiae 1, q. 44, a. 4. 
22
 Aquinas, Compendium of Theology 75. Also see Summa theologiae 1, q. 93, a. 
2; and Summa contra gentiles 2, chap. 46. 
23
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 93, a. 6. Also see Summa contra gentiles 3, 
chap. 2. Aquinas considered creatures' likeness to God within a trinitarian frame-
work. Following Augustine in The Trinity 6, chap. 10, he found a likeness of the 
Trinity by way of a trace in all creatures insofar as they are caused by the divine 
persons. In Summa theologiae 1, q. 45, a. 7, he taught that the creature represents 
the person of the Father as its cause, the person of the Word as the form conceived, 
and the person of the Holy Spirit as loved and willed to be. 
24
 John F. Kavanaugh, S.J., "Intrinsic Value, Persons and Stewardship," in The 
Challenge of Global Stewardship: Roman Catholic Responses, ed. Maura A. Ryan 
and Todd David Whitmore (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1997) 67-81. 
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ing to these three representative theologians. Inherent in their teachings is 
an understanding that creatures are related to one another, to the universe 
as a totality, and to God. 
Grades of Goodness among Creatures 
While patristic and medieval theologians taught that all creatures are 
good and valuable, they also stated that creatures vary in the extent of their 
goodness and value. This variability accords with their innate makeup and 
ways of existing. Augustine exclaimed that God did not make "all things 
equal" since the level of the goodness of creatures depends upon their 
"measure, form and order."25 Some creatures are superior to others pur-
suant to their innate characteristics, and rational creatures are God's most 
excellent creatures because God gives them the power to avoid willing 
corruption out of obedience to God.26 
Aquinas reasoned to degrees of goodness among creatures. Arguing 
against some philosophers' explanations for the differences among crea-
tures, he insisted that their characteristics are attributable only to God who 
created and, thereby, communicated various "grades of goodness" to 
them.27 Building upon Aristotle's observations, Aquinas envisioned a sim-
plistic hierarchical arrangement of diverse and unequal entities in which 
some have greater degrees of goodness than others according to their 
innate capabilities and complexities: mixed elements that are more perfect 
than the primary elements (air, water, fire, and earth), plants than minerals, 
animals than plants, and humans than other animals.28 He occasionally 
referred to this arrangement as an "order of conservation" in which the 
higher relied upon the lower for sustenance.29 Thus, mixed bodies rely 
25
 Augustine, Confessions 7, chap. 12.18. Also see Augustine's Concerning the 
City of God against the Pagans, trans. Henry Bettenson, intro. John O'Meara 
(London: Penguin, 1984) 11, chap. 22 (hereafter cited as City of God) for Augus-
tine's theocentric theory about the need for inequality in the universe. 
26
 Augustine, Confessions 13, chap. 32.47. 
27
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 48, a. 2. See also Summa contra gentiles 3, 
chap. 20. Among the many other references to God's having created many grades 
of good entities and ordering them to one another for the perfection of the universe 
are Summa theologiae 1, q. 65, a. 3; Summa contra gentiles 2, chap. 4. and 3, chap. 
71; and Compendium of Theology 73. 
28
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 47, a. 2 is one of many examples of Aquinas's 
teachings about the instrumental order of all beings that constitute the universe. 
That everything God created has a purpose to fulfill in the integral whole and all 
are related to one another in a hierarchical order to achieve their purposes as well 
as the purpose of the whole cosmos was constant in Aquinas's writings. Also see 
Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 20, 45, and 71. 
29
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 22. See also Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 
66, a. 2. 
VALUING EARTH 791 
upon the elements, plants upon mixed bodies, animals upon plants, and 
humans upon animals and plants to sustain their physical needs.30 While 
the higher type of creature is considered more valuable than the lower, 
primarily because of the higher's innate capabilities, each is essential for 
the functioning of the universe and is, therefore, valuable. The lower and 
less capable exist for the sake of the next higher type of being in the 
hierarchy, he reasoned from his medieval understanding of the world, and 
all are needed to internally maintain the universe.31 Thus, all grades of 
goodness are essential to its perfection.32 
Addressing the role of humans in this hierarchy of beings, Aquinas 
explained that humans have the highest degree of goodness among physical 
creatures because humans can embrace and transcend the corporeal 
world33 through their ability to reflect on what is stored in their memory, 
to choose to act according to the dictates of reason,34 and to cooperate with 
God's grace in seeking eternal happiness with God.35 Humans use other 
creatures in two ways during their temporal lives: (1) as instruments or 
31
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 65, a. 2. Each creature exists for its own 
proper act and perfection, the lower on the hierarchical scale exists for the higher, 
while every creature exists for the perfection of the universe that is ordered toward 
God inasmuch as it imitates and shows forth the Divine goodness to the glory of 
God. 
32
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 47, a. 2; he alluded to Aristotle's Metaphysics 
8.10 when describing this hierarchical configuration. The concept of a hierarchy of 
beings has its basis in Greek philosophy, flourished in the patristic and medieval 
periods, and is the subject of a lecture given by Arthur Q. Lovejoy in 1933 which 
was published subsequently as The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of 
an Idea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1957). Aquinas's understanding of 
the hierarchical chain is highly organic. 
33
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 76, a. 1. 
34
 Aquinas, Compendium of Theology 18; Summa contra gentiles 2, chap. 46 
and 86; 4, chap. 11; and Summa theologiae 1, qq. 76, a. 1 and 78, a. 1; 2-2, q. 179, 
a. 1. For Aquinas, humans are the only corporeal creatures capable of transcend-
ing the conditions of matter {Summa theologiae 1, q. 76, a. 1) because the human 
intellectual power is independent of matter (Summa contra gentiles 2, chap. 86) as 
it elevates the human soul beyond what is corruptible (Compendium of Theology 
84). Because the human creature is endowed with intellectual capability, the hu-
man images and has the greatest likeness to God, he taught in Compendium 
of Theology 75, Summa theologiae 1, q. 93, a. 2, and Summa contra gentiles 2, 
chap. 46. 
Aquinas, On Truth 3, q. 24, a. 5, 11 and 27; God offers grace to humans to 
enable their cooperation with God's intention that they seek the temporal good in 
this life while aiming for eternal happiness. For an exploration of Aquinas's un-
derstanding of how the human can cooperate with God, see my "The Virtuous 
Cooperator: Modeling the Human in an Ecologically Endangered Age," World-
views: Environment, Culture, Religion 1 (2003) 171-95. 
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means through which human life can be sustained, and (2) as instruments 
or means through which knowledge of God can be obtained.36 
Humans are expected to exercise their rational and volitional abilities 
when using other creatures, he insisted, since these abilities are intended by 
God to aid them in acquiring their temporal needs.37 The necessities of life 
are things that humans require to support their bodies, such as food, cloth-
ing, transportation,38 and those things without which they cannot carry on 
their lives in appropriate ways as they seek eternal happiness with God.39 
While the latter may appear initially to open to the possibilities of excessive 
use by some, Aquinas explicitly proscribed the exorbitant use of God's 
other creatures, describing it as inordinate and wasteful,40 immoderate,41 
disordered, and vicious.42 He judged the excessive use of other entities as 
sinful in the scheme of the human quest for eternity with God.43 
Aquinas's teachings that humans can use other creatures to know God 
reflect his sacramental view of the physical world as a means through which 
God's goodness, wisdom, power, and other attributes can be contem-
plated.44 The physical world can lead humans to God, he contended, re-
36
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 3, chap.78. 
37
 Aquinas stressed repeatedly that humans should restrict their actions on other 
creatures to acquiring the necessities of life and knowing God as they seek their 
eternal goal; see, for example, Summa theologiae, Supp. q. 91, a. 1; 1-2, q. 4, a. 6-7; 
and q. 114, a. 10; 2-2, q. 76, a. 2; q. 83, a. 6; and q. 118, a. 1; Summa contra gentiles 
3, chap. 22; and Compendium of Theology 173. Aquinas considered the human use 
of other creatures for the necessities of life and knowing God as an exercise of 
natural dominion; see, for example, Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 66, a. 1-2, Compen-
dium of Theology 74, 127, and 148, and Summa contra gentiles 3, chaps. 78 and 
111-112. In Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 66, a. 1, he insisted that God retains absolute 
dominion over both users and used. 
38
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 141, a. 6; see also Supp. q. 91, a. 1; 2-2, q. 
64, a. 1; and q. 83, a. 6. Also see his Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 22,121,129 and 
131. Resounding throughout his works is the prescription that humans are intended 
to use only what is needed to sustain human life and not what is desired beyond the 
necessities of life. 
39
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1-2, q. 4, a. 7; see also 2-2, q. 83, a. 6; q. 118, a. 1; 
and q. 141, a. 6. 
40
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 83, a. 6. 
41
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 169, a. 1. For Aquinas's understanding of 
the "appropriate" use of things by humans, see Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 129, 
where he teaches that some uses for the necessities of life are naturally fitting, 
whereas immoderate uses are naturally unfitting in the scheme of the integrity of 
the universe and, ultimately, in the human quest for eternal happiness with God. 
42
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 4, chap. 83. 
43
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 118, a. 1; also see 2-2, q. 83, a. 6. See further 
Summa contra gentiles 4, chap. 83. 
44
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 2, chap. 2; also see 3, chap. 47, and 4, chap. 1. 
Summa theologiae 1, q. 65, a. 1, and 2-2, q. 180, a. 4 demonstrate his optimistic belief 
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ferring occasionally to Romans 1:20 and Wisdom 13, especially if they start 
from their faith perspective that the world is God's creation and approach 
it as a means of knowing about and loving God.45 Through their ability to 
make and execute informed decisions, an ability that distinguishes humans 
from other material creatures, humans should know that their eternal end 
is God and should act rightly to achieve that end.46 
The great medieval theologian extended his understanding of the instru-
mental use of creatures by humans and by God. Humans also use other 
humans, he taught, and God uses all creatures for divine purposes. Other 
humans are the most important creatures a human uses, since they need 
one another to secure the necessities of life.47 Moreover, all creatures are 
like God's instruments created to serve God's purposes,48 since whoever 
makes something for an end—a purpose—may use it to achieve that pur-
49 
pose. 
Clearly, the instrumental value of all creatures looms large in patristic 
and medieval theological reflections. However, use by humans is limited to 
using other creatures to sustain human life, not to satisfy superfluous de-
sires, and to knowing more about God. 
The Greater Goodness of the Totality of Creation 
Though patristic and medieval theologians valued each type of creature 
intrinsically in ways unique to their natures and instrumentally as means of 
sustaining themselves in the hierarchy of beings, they valued the entirety of 
the physical world most highly. They particularly valued the orderly func-
tioning of the universe. According to their teachings, God wisely created 
the universe, generously endowed it with the capability of maintaining 
itself internally, and sustains it in existence.50 
that humans have been gifted by God with the capacity to rise gradually from the 
world to limited knowledge of God. Aquinas expressed his sacramental view of the 
world in ways less emotive than found in works by Augustine, Hugh of St. Victor, 
Bonaventure, and Francis of Assisi. The sacramental quality of the world was 
explored frequently in patristic and medieval theological discourse as I demonstrate 
in "Acting Reverently in God's Sacramental World," in Ethical Dilemmas in the 
New Millennium II, ed. Francis A. Eigo (Villanova, Penn.: Villanova University, 
2001) 37-90. 
45
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 65, a. 1; see further 2-2, q. 180, a. 4, and Supp. 
q. 91, a. 1. 
46
 See, for example, Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 1, chap. 92. 
47
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 128. Also see Summa theologiae 1, q. 
96, a. 4; 2-2, q. 47, a. 10. 
48
 Ibid. 3, chap. 100. 
49
 Ibid. 3, chap. 64. 
50
 Tarsicius Van Bavel, O.S A. , rightly points to patristic theologians' ascription 
to the internal sustainability of the cosmos that God created and sustains in exis-
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Some theologians affirmed the superlative goodness of the physical 
world when reflecting on Genesis 1:31. For example, Augustine wrote that 
the ensemble of all entities constitute a "wonderful order and beauty."51 
There is a "tranquility of order" in the arrangement of "equal and unequal 
entities in their proper positions," and this arrangement brings about "the 
peace of the universe."52 Indeed, "God has made all things very good," he 
exclaimed.53 
Aquinas expounded systematically on the goodness of the universe that 
is brought about by the orderly functioning of its constituents in relation to 
one another. From his understanding that each type of creature has value, 
he described glowingly the unity brought about by their orderly interac-
tivity as the greatest created good,54 the highest perfection of the created 
world,55 and its most beautiful attribute.56 The order of things to one 
another is the nearest thing to God's goodness, he insisted, because every 
particular good is ordered to the good of the whole.57 It is not contradictory 
for some things to exist for the sake of others and also for the sake of the 
perfection of the universe, he taught, since some are needed by others to 
maintain the internal integrity of the universe while all things are needed 
to contribute to its perfection.58 When all parts function in relation to one 
another in innately appropriate ways as intended by God, the universe is 
indeed perfect, it reflects God's goodness, and it manifests God's glory.59 
tence ("The Creator and the Integrity of Creation in the Fathers of the Church, 
Especially in Saint Augustine," Augustinian Studies 21 [1990] 1-33). See also How-
ard J. VanTill, "Basil, Augustine, and the Doctrine of Creation's Functional Integ-
rity," Science and Christian Belief 8 (1996) 21-38. 
51
 Augustine, Enchiridion 10. 
52
 Augustine, City of God 19, chap. 13. 
53
 Augustine, Confessions 7, chap. 12.18. Also see City of God 11, chap. 22, for his 
theocentric theory about the need for "inequality" among creatures in the universe. 
54
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 2, chap. 39.7; see further 2, chap. 44 and 45; 3, 
chap. 69 and 144. Also see Summa theologiae 1, q. 15, a. 2 and q. 22, a. 1-2. 
5
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 2, chap. 45; see further chap. 44. 
56
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 71. The universe cannot be any better 
than it is, he wrote in Summa heologiae 1, q. 25, a. 6, ad 3, because of the most 
beautiful order given to things by God. As John H. Wright concludes from 
Aquinas's works in The Order of the Universe in the Theology of St. Thomas 
Aquinas (Rome: Gregorian University, 1957) 87; the universe is "God's master-
piece" with its excellence found in the ordered harmony of its parts. 
57
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 64 and 112. See also Summa theolo-
giae 1, q. 47, a. 2. The integrity of all created beings is described in Summa contra 
gentiles 2, chap. 45 as the ultimate and noblest perfection in things which in turn are 
ordered to the ultimate uncreated good who is God. 
58
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 112. 
59
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 65, a. 2. The interactive order of all things 
created by God is the greatest perfection and the most beautiful attribute of ere-
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While the intrinsic value of the orderly universe appears conclusive in 
the reflections of these three theologians, Aquinas explicitly addressed the 
instrumental use of the orderly universe by God. God uses the universe as 
its principal cause to produce its principal effect,60 which is a unity of 
diverse beings that function internally according to natural law established 
by God.61 A universe that functions as intended by God most superbly 
manifests God's goodness.62 Thus, the order of instrumentality begins with 
God and extends hierarchically downward to natural entities. While all 
types are intrinsically valuable as essential components of the universe, 
they are also instrumentally valuable to one another for their sustenance, 
and, as a totality, they are instrumentally valuable to God to achieve God's 
purposes.63 
The Common Good 
Closely aligned with the greater goodness of the totality of creation is 
Aquinas's teaching that God created living and nonliving entities in an 
orderly relationship to one another to achieve their internal common 
ation because it reflects the goodness and wisdom of God, Aquinas wrote in Com-
pendium of Theology 102. Also see Summa contra gentiles 2, chap. 42; and Summa 
theologiae 1, q. 2, a. 3; q. 4, a. 2; and q. 13, a. 2. 
60
 St. Thomas Aquinas, On the Power of God (Qucestiones disputatce de potentia 
Dei), trans. English Dominican Fathers (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 
1932) 3, q. 7 (hereafter cited as On the Power of God). James A. Weisheipl under-
scores this point in Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work (Garden 
City: Doubleday, 1974) 205. 
61
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1-2, q. 93, a. 5. For Aquinas, natural law is the 
result of God's imposition of eternal law upon the universe at its creation to govern 
all things internally to their ends and ultimately to God; see, for example, Summa 
theologiae 1-2, q. 91, a. 1, and q. 93, a.l; also On Truth 1, q. 5, a. 1.6. 
62
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 65, a. 2, and Compendium of Theology 102. 
See also Summa contra gentiles 2, chap. 39,44-46, and 68; 3 chap. 64,69,71 and 144; 
Summa theologiae 1, q. 15, a. 2; 22, a. 1-2; 25, q. 6 ad 3; and q. 47, a. 2. 
63
 Oliva Blanchette observed in Aquinas's works an order of instrumentality 
among corporeal things. However, the order of instrumentality goes beyond hu-
man-corporeal parameters to encompasses the totality of existence with God as the 
ultimate mover of an instrumental order (The Perfection of the Universe according 
to Aquinas: A Teleological Cosmology [University Park: Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity, 1991] at 256). This more comprehensive instrumental order should be con-
sidered by contemporary critics who are troubled by Aquinas's view that other 
corporeal creatures are instruments for the human. For example, see H. Paul Sant-
mire, The Travail of Nature: the Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian The-
ology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985) 90-91; also William C. French, "Catholicism 
and the Common Good of the Biosphere," in An Ecology of the Spirit: Religious 
Reflection and Environmental Consciousness, ed. Michael H. Barnes (Lanham, 
Md.: University Press of America, 1994) 177-94, at 193. 
796 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 
good—the well-functioning of the universe. Paralleling his treatment of 
the common good of the universe with the common good of citizens that 
constitute a particular society, he identified the common good as a basic 
principle in the way God governs the universe and in the way a king rules 
a kingdom. Both seek the good of many over the good of one.65 
To achieve the common good, Aquinas continued, God instilled in each 
type of creature a natural inclination toward the good of the whole66 with 
each inclined intellectually, sensitively, or naturally to their mutual good.67 
Stones and other entities without knowledge and sensation fall into the 
natural inclination category.68 Each type of creature is more strongly in-
clined to the common good than to itself, as demonstrated by its function 
within the universe.69 Sometimes creatures suffer damages to themselves 
for the sake of the common good.70 At the root of this appetite for the 
common good is the natural inclination each creature has for God who is 
the absolute common good of all creatures.71 
While all parts are inclined toward the common good of the whole, 
Aquinas explained, entities that have a higher grade of goodness have a 
greater appetite for the common good, and they are inclined to seek to do 
good for others far removed from themselves.72 The human aptitude for 
the whole requires that a person will a particular good to the common 
good; if the person does not, that act of the will is not right.73 
Human willing is supposed to be aimed toward the common good and 
64
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1-2, q. 19, a. 10. The common good of the universe 
is its integrity which results from the order and composition of all its parts, Aquinas 
taught, for example, in Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 94, On the Power of God 1, 
q. 6, a. 1, and Summa theologiae 1, q. 115, a. 3. Each part has an essential role to play 
in the whole; while some are better than others in their ways of being and acting due 
to their innate capabilities, all creatures are requisite for the functioning of the 
whole—contingent and noncontingent, corporeal and incorporeal, corruptible and 
incorruptible. See his discussion in Summa contra gentiles 1, chap. 85; On the Power 
of God 1, q. 6, a. 1; and Summa theologiae 1, q. 103, a. 7. 
65
 Aquinas, On Truth 1, q. 5, a. 3. 
66
 For example, see Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1-2, q. 109, a. 3, and 2-2, q. 26, 
a. 3. 
67
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 26, a. 3. 
68
 Ibid. Also see Summa theologiae 1-2, q. 26, a. 1. 
69
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 60, a. 5; see further 2-2, q. 26, a. 3, ad 2. 
70
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 26, a. 3. He pointed specifically to citizens 
who suffer losses to their own property and themselves personally for the sake of 
their community's common good. 
71
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 60, a. 5, ad 3-5; see further 2-2, q. 26, a. 3. 
72
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 24.8. Also see Summa theologiae 1, q. 
57, a. 2. 
73
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1-2, q. 19, a. 10. His understanding of what is right 
is based ultimately on an action's being directed ultimately toward God. 
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ultimately toward the individual's lasting relationship with God. Because 
humans often act incorrectly, God cares providentially for individual hu-
mans by offering them grace to help them exercise their wills appropri-
ately.74 God's grace both operates on and cooperates with humans toward 
their ultimate goal75 without interfering in the human exercise of freely 
making and carrying out decisions.76 God's grace operates lovingly on the 
human spirit so the individual thinks about and acts in ways that are con-
ducive to achieving eternal life.77 God's grace cooperates with the human 
by actively sustaining the innate human capacity to make informed deci-
sions and to choose to act accordingly. God's grace also operates on and 
cooperates with humans to develop moral virtues that will aid them in 
exercising their wills appropriately to achieve the common good in this life 
because they are motivated to achieve eternal life with God.78 
All entities that constitute the universe benefit from being moved toward 
the common good of the whole, Aquinas taught.79 Using a parallel example 
of the leader of an army, he maintained that the ordering of all parts to the 
good of the whole is what a leader of an army does when intending its 
74
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 22, a. 2. Also see Summa contra gentiles 3, 
chap. 112-13 and On Truth 1, q. 5, a. 6-7. According to Aquinas, God's special care 
is needed for individual humans who have the capacity to think about how to act 
and to choose to act, capacities that humans often misuse. This special divine care 
for individual humans contrasts with God's general care for other species through 
natural laws embedded in the physical world because other-than-humans do not 
have intellectual capabilities or free will with which to deviate from God's inten-
tions. God's care for individual humans and other species should be considered in 
relation to Aquinas's teaching in Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 64, that among 
God's creation God cares most for the order of all things that constitute the uni-
verse. 
75
 Aquinas, On Truth 3, q. 24, a. 11; see further q. 27, a. 5. 
76
 This follows Aquinas's rationale that God governs all things to their end 
through God's eternal law, which God imposed on the universe in the form of 
natural law; see, for example, Summa theologiae 1-2, q. 91, a. 1, and q. 93, a. 1-5; and 
On Truth 1, q. 5, a.l. On his thinking about rational creatures who are ruled by 
eternal law and are rulers of themselves to whom God gives grace to seek their 
ultimate end, see Summa theologiae 1-2, q. 109, a. 1, and Summa contra gentiles 3, 
chap. 1. 
77
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1-2, q. 110, a. 1. 
78
 See, for example, Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. I l l , a. 2, and On Truth 3, 
q. 27, a. 5. As Jacques Maritain explained in The Person and the Common Good, 
trans. John J. Fitzgerald (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1947) 7-10, when com-
menting on Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2, before humans are "related to the 
immanent common good of the universe, they are related to an infinitely greater 
good—the separated common Good, the divine transcendent Whole." 
79
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 11, a. 3; see further 1-2, q. 19, a. 10, on how 
the common good benefits all constituents of the universe. Also see Summa contra 
gentiles 1, chap. 70; 2, chap. 41; and 3, chap. 69. 
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mutual good. All members of the army benefit from the ordering of parts 
to one another that enables them to function appropriately so the good of 
the whole can be attained.81 
Aquinas maintained that God intends all entities to cooperate for the 
good of the whole. In the operations of unintelligible beings, there is almost 
always harmony and usefulness in things because they are directed toward 
their ends by God.82 God also intends harmony and cooperation to prevail 
among all diverse constituents of the universe, including creatures gifted 
with the ability to think and to will the common good.83 As Joseph Legrand 
observed from Aquinas's teachings, no part of creation or type of creature 
is excluded from God's intention that all cooperate, combine, or harmonize 
within the order of the universe established by God to achieve the good 
that is common to all.84 
When Aquinas contended that creatures cooperate in securing the com-
mon good, he was not only thinking about creatures cooperating among 
themselves within the hierarchical scale of beings that assures their internal 
sustainability. He also thought about the intercooperation of creatures as 
ways of cooperating with God. He insisted that higher creatures on the 
scale of beings are meant to cooperate with God in acquiring the good of 
the whole universe. A higher creature receives more abundant goodness 
from God as demonstrated by the creature's nature and way of acting. 
Unless the higher creature cooperates in procuring the good of lower crea-
tures, the abundance of goodness given to the higher creature would be 
confined to one individual or few.85 The good of many is better than the 
good of an individual, he continued, and the good of the universe as a 
whole is best because it is more representative of the divine goodness. 
Furthermore, Aquinas taught that goodness becomes common to many 
by the fact that the more richly endowed creature cooperates in procuring 
the good of many.86 Higher creatures are expected to cooperate in seeking 
the good of others, and it is with this expectation that God rules lower 
creatures through higher creatures. 
Creatures cooperate with one another for the good of the whole, 
Aquinas reasoned, because they are related to God as their Creator. God 
ordered them to one another with the intention that they achieve their 
internal common good as an integral whole and thereby manifest God's 
80
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1-2, q. 9, a. 1. 
81
 Aquinas, On the Power of God 2, q. 4, a. 2, ad 29. 
82
 Aquinas, On Truth 1, q. 5, a. 2 
83
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 11, a. 3. 
84
 Joseph Legrand, Uunivers et Vhomme dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas, 2 
vols. (Brussels: Edition Universelle, 1946) 1:40.1 
85
 Aquinas, Compendium of Theology 124. 
86
 Ibid. 
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goodness. In one of his most succinct treatments of this subject, Aquinas 
explained that the entire universe of interconnected parts achieves its pur-
pose through the functioning of all parts in relation to one another in ways 
that are appropriate to the innate characteristics of each part.87 Function-
ing in these relational ways as an entirety of interconnected parts best 
manifests God's goodness and gives glory to God.88 Thus, the created common 
good is the good of the whole order of beings functioning in appropriate, 
relational ways to sustain themselves as intended by God toward whom 
they aim as the uncreated common good of the entire universe. 
William French contends astutely that Aquinas's notion of the common 
good provides a "cosmological-ecological principle" for his ethical sys-
tem.89 From the perspective of ecological degradation today, the good 
sought in common would be the good of ecological systems of which hu-
mans are integral actors relying on other interacting biota and abiota for 
their health and well-being. This ethical framework of the common good 
for addressing environmental issues also appeals to Merle Longwood who 
recognizes the need for remaining cognizant of human existence in the 
"complex and subtly balanced system" of "the web of life" in which "all the 
parts function to maintain the quality of the integrated whole."90 
God's Valuation 
Christian theologians have taught that God values the physical world 
with its many diverse constituents. Augustine counted the number of times 
87
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 65, a. 2. 
88
 Ibid. 
89
 French, "Catholicism and the Common Good of the Biosphere" 192. While 
French sees this organizing principle as a promising response to our contemporary 
ecological morass, he finds it often "overwhelmed" by another organizing principle 
which he describes as "the absolute superiority of rational human life over all lesser 
creatures," a premise for which he sees little room in theological ethics today. 
However, he does not factor into his evaluation the severe restrictions Aquinas 
places on how human beings function in relation to other creatures because of their 
mutual relationship to God. See also Robert P. George, "Natural Law, the Com-
mon Good, and American Politics," in The Battle for the Catholic Mind : Catholic 
Faith and Catholic Intellect in the Work of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, 
1978-95, ed. intro. William E. May and Kenneth D. Whitehead (South Bend: St. 
Augustine, 2001) 308-21; and Brian J. Benestad, "How the Catholic Church Serves 
the Common Good," in ibid. 443-61. 
90
 Merle Longwood, "The Common Good: An Ethical Framework for Evaluat-
ing Environmental Issues," Theological Studies 34 (1973) 468-80, at 479. I concur 
with Longwood's perceptive conclusion: "Our conception of the common good 
must obviously include the whole biotic community, since the quality and health of 
human life is integrally tied to the quality and health of the lives of all the other 
members of the biosphere. There is, after all, only one ecology, not a human 
ecology on the one hand and a subhuman ecology on the other" (479-80). 
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in Genesis 1 that God is depicted as having created a being, observed it, 
and proclaimed it good.91 That God evaluates a creature and finds it good 
was significant from his faith perspective.92 God is the ultimate authority 
for valuations. 
In a celebrated homily on Genesis 1, Chrysostom stressed the authority 
of God's valuation. He warned his flock against the "arrogant folly" of 
failing to honor God's valuing of the physical world. He first told them to 
"shun . . . like a lunatic" anyone who did not acquiesce to God's judgment 
about the world's goodness, and subsequently instructed them to inform 
the ignorant about God's valuation in order to "check" the ignorant per-
son's "unruly tongue."93 God created everything by his loving and thought-
ful kindness, according to Chrysostom. Nothing was created idly by God 
nor is any creature without purpose.94 
Aquinas also ascribed ultimate authority to God's valuation of the physi-
cal world. Within his emanation-return schema of God's creating and gov-
erning the orderly universe, he found compatibility between the account in 
Genesis 1 of God's superlative evaluation of the entirety of creation and Aristo-
tle's reasoning about the order of the universe as the greatest created good.95 
Furthermore, Aquinas insisted that God cares most for the order of the 
universe. He reasoned that the nearest thing to God's goodness among 
created things is the good of the order of the universe, since every particu-
lar good is ordered to an end, just as the less perfect is ordered to the more 
perfect culminating in the human, and each part, including the human, is 
for the sake of the whole.96 
Even more profoundly, Aquinas taught that God loves the orderly uni-
verse with the highest kind of love—ex cavitate?1 While God loves all 
creatures ex amove, the love of desire that they exist98 and are useful to 
rational creatures in their temporal lives,99 and God loves ex amove and ex 
cavitate rational creatures more than another kind of creature or several 
creatures because rational creatures can participate in God's goodness as 
their eternal end,100 God loves the universe ex cavitate more than God loves 
91
 Augustine, Confessions 13, chap. 29.44. 
92
 Augustine, Confessions 13, chap. 31.46: "No less rightly is it said to those who 
see in the Spirit of God, 'It is not you who see,' so that whatsoever in the Spirit of 
God they see to be good, it is not they but God who sees that it is good." 
93
 Chrysostom, On Genesis, Homily 10.13, 137. 
94
 Ibid. 
95
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 64. 
96
 Ibid. 97 Aquinas, On Charity 7 ad 5. 
98
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 20, a. 3. 
99
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 20, a. 2, ad 3. 
100
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 90. Also see Summa theologiae 1-2, 
q. 110, a. 1. 
VALUING EARTH 801 
rational creatures or any other or several kinds of creatures. This is 
because the order of creatures to one another to achieve their common 
good best manifests God's goodness as perfectly as creatures can.102 
From these teachings emerges an understanding of God's intrinsic-
instrumental valuing of the entire universe of diverse living and nonliving 
entities. God values the entire universe most as a functioning whole of 
intrinsically valuable beings that achieve their purposes for existing by 
acting or being acted upon according to their natures. God also values all 
types of beings as instruments of other beings progressively up the hierar-
chical chain by which the universe maintains itself.103 Furthermore, the 
universe is like God's instrument for achieving the divine purposes for it,104 
thereby serving eminently as the best possible manifestation of God's 
goodness.105 
Human Valuation 
Augustine connected human valuing of the physical world with human 
limitations and self-centered tendencies. Humans are gifted with intellec-
tual abilities, he explained, but our entrenchment in a part of the universe 
and our condition as mortal beings prevents us from comprehending the 
universe in its entirety. Only God has this all-encompassing intellectual 
capacity. Nevertheless, humans should overcome their narrow-mindedness 
101
 Aquinas, On Charity 7 ad 5; Aquinas insisted that God loves the orderly 
universe maxime ex caritate. 
102
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 65, a. 2, and Compendium of Theology 102. 
103
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 100; following Aristotle's commen-
tary on De anima 2.6, Aquinas noted that animals use plants and inanimate things 
while plants use inanimate things by taking nourishment and support from them. In 
On the Power of God 1, q. 5, a. 9, he taught that it is not contrary to the nature of 
any created thing when it is moved in any way by God, since all things were created 
the way they are in order to serve God. Thus, for Aquinas, the entirety of creation 
is like an instrument that produces its principal effect when being used by its 
principal cause. Weisheipl confirms Aquinas's instrumental view in Friar Thomas 
D'Aquino 206. 
104
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 100, and On the Power of God 1, q. 
3, a. 7 ad 3, and q. 5, a. 9. See also Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino 206. In 
Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 100, Aquinas explained that instruments are made 
for the purpose of subserving the action of the principal agent while being moved 
by that agent, so it is not contrary to the nature of any created thing when it is 
moved in any way by God since all things were made the way they are in order to 
serve God. In On the Power of God 1. q. 3, a. 7, ad 3, he taught that the entirety of 
creation is like an instrument that produces its principal effect by being used by its 
principal cause. 
105
 For example, see Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 65, a. 2; q. 15, a. 2; q. 22, 
a. 1-2; and q. 25, a. 6 ad 3; Summa contra gentiles 2, chap. 39, 44, and 68; and 
Compendium of Theology 102. 
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and self-centeredness that is manifested by judging negatively some natural 
beings and forces that cause them personal discomforts. Humans should 
consider the natures of things in themselves without regard to their con-
venience or inconvenience, their pleasantness or unpleasantness, their 
comfort or discomfort. Humans should praise God for all aspects of the 
physical world and never "in the rashness of human folly" allow themselves 
to find fault in any way with the work of the "great Artificer." Humans 
must have confidence in God's overall design, God's continuing care, and 
God's purpose for all things that comprise the beautiful universe.106 
In addition to addressing the intrinsic value of the physical world, Au-
gustine focused on the human use of other creatures. God created all things 
in supreme wisdom and ordered them in perfect justice to one another. To 
humans God has given good things suitable to this life, including light to 
see, air to breathe, water to drink, and food to eat. Every human who uses 
these goods correctly "shall receive goods greater in degree and superior in 
kind, namely the peace of immortality" within which God can be enjoyed 
eternally. The person who uses these goods incorrectly "shall lose them and 
shall not receive the blessings of eternal life."107 
Chrysostom characterized Earth as "mother and nurse" created by God 
to nourish humans.108 They are destined by God to enjoy Earth as their 
"homeland" for which they should be grateful to God.109 
Aquinas also reflected on human valuation of the physical world from 
intrinsic and instrumental perspectives. As John F. Kavanaugh notes, when 
describing the human as a creature with the cognitive capacity to recognize 
the goodness of the physical world and the volitional capacity to choose to 
value it, Aquinas presented the human as an intrinsic valuer.110 His teach-
ing about the human capacity to discover the rational plan by which God 
directed one creature to the other111 also opens to recognizing humans as 
instrumental valuers. Upon discovering the instrumental relationships of 
entities to one another that brings about their sustainability as intended by 
God, humans should value them and their interactions. 
That humans should value the physical world with its diverse constitu-
ents is also supported by Aquinas's teaching that God has given humans a 
106
 Augustine, City of God 12, chap. 4. 
107
 Ibid. 19, chap. 13. 
108
 Chrysostom, On Genesis, Homily 9.3. He also describes earth as the human 
"tomb" to which the human body would return. 
109
 Ibid. 10.12. 
110
 As Kavanaugh notes, the "intrinsic value" approach, "stresses that there are 
certain actions which, no matter what the external factors or the internal motives, 
are somehow profoundly evil in themselves, independent of their usefulness or our 
intentions" ("Intrinsic Value, Persons and Stewardship" 71). 
111
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 78. 
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"natural dominion" over God's creation while God maintains "absolute 
dominion."112 The natural dominion exercised by humans is based on the 
ability to know and to will good ends, and humans are always subservient 
to God's dominion when exercising their dominion which, contra William 
French, is never "absolute."113 Thus, human dominion is aimed at coop-
erating with God in carrying out God's plan for the universe and not 
hindering it in any way.114 
Another dimension of valuing the physical world intrinsically and instru-
mentally is Aquinas's teaching that humans can also love the entire uni-
verse of diverse beings with the highest kind of love—maxime et caritate.115 
He specified two ways: (1) as good entities that should be conserved for 
God's honor and glory;116 and (2) as goods needed by other humans as they 
seek eternal happiness with God.117 The intrinsic and instrumental valua-
tions surface explicitly from these two ways of loving the universe of many 
varied beings ex caritate to the maximum possible extent. 
Finally, Aquinas's praise for the orderly interaction of natural beings 
that maintains the integrity of the physical world provides an exemplar for 
also valuing the integrity of the universe through which the temporal com-
mon good—its sustainability—is realized. His teaching that humans should 
seek the common good when willing a particular good118 provides an entry 
into thinking more expansively about valuing the functioning of the physi-
cal world. The sustainable functioning of ecosystems and the greater bio-
sphere is indeed a good that humans have in common with other biota and 
abiota that comprise these systems. When humans will that common good, 
they are conforming their wills to God's valuation of the physical world.119 
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS THROUGH A 21st-CENTURY LENS 
From these selected reflections on the goodness of creation emerge sev-
eral significant implications for a system of ethics that can be responsive to 
ecological degradation. All species, the air, land, and waters are valuable 
intrinsically as components of Earth; they are also valuable instrumentally 
as needed by other components to sustain themselves within the web of 
life. Ecological systems are valuable intrinsically as a composite of intrin-
112
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 96, a. 1. 
113
 French, "Catholicism and the Common Good of the Biosphere" 192. 
114
 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 78-79. 
115
 Aquinas, On Charity 7, ad 5. 
116
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 25, a. 3 and 11. 
117
 For example, see Aquinas, On Charity 3; and Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 23, a. 
8, and q. 47, a. 1, ad 1. 
118
 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1-2, q. 19, a. 10. 
119
 Ibid. 
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sically-instrumentally valuable biota and abiota functioning interdepen-
dently to sustain their shared existence; they are also valuable instrumen-
tally for their contributions to the sustainability of the larger biosphere. 
The biosphere is valuable intrinsically as the composite of all systems with 
biotic and abiotic constituents along with adjoining marginal areas that 
altogether constitute Earth; the biosphere is also valuable instrumentally as 
a home used by humans, other species, and ecological systems. The entirety 
of the physical world with its many diverse constituents is valuable to God, 
their purposeful creator and sustainer in existence, who endowed humans 
with the intellectual capacity to discern the intrinsic and instrumental val-
ues of the physical world, to behold these values, and to demonstrate these 
valuations throughout their lives. 
Parallels with Secular Philosophical Issues 
Some of these implications for ethics parallel broadly the proposals prof-
fered by both intrinsic and instrumental value theorists over the past 25 
years. A particularly prominent parallel with patristic and medieval think-
ing is Rolston's position that value is a property of the physical world that 
preexists humans and is available for discovery by them. For Christian 
theologians, God bestows and upholds the physical world's value, God's 
valuing preexists humans, and faith-filled Christians who desire eternal 
happiness with God have a strong incentive both for using their intellectual 
capabilities to discover the value of individuals, species, the air, land, water, 
ecological systems, their marginal areas, the biosphere, and the entire uni-
verse and for demonstrating their valuations. 
Another important parallel between the earlier theologians and some 
current environmental ethicists is the good of the whole as the basis for 
adjudicating conflicts between humans and other species. Callicott pro-
motes this common good adjudication in principle through Aldo Leopold's 
"land ethic," Longwood through the Aristotelian concept of "the common 
good," and French and Kavanaugh through Aquinas's Christianization of 
Aristotle's understanding of the common good. Maintaining the sustain-
ability of natural entities individually and collectively is their common good 
that is intended by God as explained in its fullest sense by Aquinas. Thus, 
all claims would have to be adjudicated on the basis of the extent to which 
the claim is essential to the sustainability of an entity according to its 
nature, its purpose within the ecological system, and the overall sustain-
ability of that system. 
While human claims for using individuals of other species, the air, the 
land, and waters would have to meet this common good criterion, human 
claims could advance beyond bodily existence to encompass spiritual 
needs. A primary spiritual need for present and future generations is the 
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opportunity to experience God's presence and goodness through the physi-
cal world. Honoring spiritual claims places additional constraints on human 
use in order to assure that other humans now and into the future are not 
prevented from encountering God through the world. Among these con-
straints are avoiding actions that precipitate the extinction of a species, the 
loss of biodiversity in an ecological system, the pollution of air, waterways 
and land, the widening of the rupture in the ozone layer of Earth, and the 
littering of cosmic "space." 
Requiring humans to constrain their use of other creatures to the neces-
sities of life corresponds with the philosophy of "deep ecology" developed 
by Arne Naess, Bill Devall, and George Sessions. Deep ecologists recog-
nize the legitimacy of human use of other species and abiota, though they 
insist it must be balanced by valuing them intrinsically in order to minimize 
the impact on the physical environment.120 As indicated previously, patris-
tic and medieval theologians taught Christians to consume only what is 
needed to sustain their temporal lives while preparing for their eternal 
destinies with God. They also reflected on a belief that further constrains 
human use and that is without parallel in secular philosophy—God's pres-
ence is experienced in the world and God's attributes are known through 
the world. This sacramental character of Earth, its ecological systems, and 
their species requires valuing them both intrinsically and instrumentally.121 
Updating Patristic and Medieval Notions 
However promising patristic and medieval notions about the goodness of 
God's creation and its intrinsic-instrumental value appear to be, their re-
formulation is essential to reflect our contemporary understanding of the 
world so the system of ethics developed is as relevant and meaningful as 
possible. Augustine, Chrysostom, Aquinas, and their contemporaries 
viewed the world as geocentric, its diverse constituents as having been 
created with time as specific types ordered hierarchically in relation to one 
another to function as God intended with freedom allowed only for the 
human will, and each creature as having a purpose in God's plan. The 
goodness of creatures and the superlative goodness of the world in its 
totality were attributed directly to God's having created them as they were 
observed through the senses. Thus, their valuation was tied to the "fixed" 
120
 Arne Naess, "The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects," 
Philosophical Inquiry 8 (1986) 10-31; Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecol-
ogy: Living as If Nature Mattered (Salt Lake City: Gibbs Smith, 1985). Deep ecolo-
gists also insist that the human use of other species must be balanced with their 
intrinsic value so the impact on the environment is minimal. 
121
 The term "sacramental" is used in the broadest sense to convey the under-
standing that God's presence and character can be experienced through the world. 
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specificity of the wondrous world as seen through their patristic and me-
dieval lenses. 
Our current understanding of the world is vastly different. According to 
scientific findings and theories, the universe has been expanding from per-
haps a finite singularity for approximately 13.8 billion years. Billions of 
galaxies have been discovered with billions of stars. The furnaces of stars 
produced carbon, nitrogen, and other elements essential for life to emerge 
on at least one planet that revolves around one middle-aged star. Rela-
tionships within the biological evolutionary process are dynamic, interde-
pendent, and holistic.122 An interplay of physical laws and chance seems to 
be operative with an openness to a future that cannot be predicted with 
accuracy. Though humans have capacities not yet discovered elsewhere, we 
are products of this evolutionary process and radically related to and in-
terconnected with everything living and nonliving in the universe, espe-
cially the constituents of Earth. Humans are also radically dependent upon 
other species, the air, the land, water, ecological systems, and the biosphere 
for our health and well-being. 
In order to be meaningful, theological discourse must be realistic about 
the world as disclosed through scientific investigations and relevant to the 
ecologically endangered times in which we live. Discourse can be mean-
ingful for monotheists by beginning to reflect from a position of faith in 
God, the purposeful creator who sustains the world and values its totality, 
and by proceeding to inform this basic faith with broad scientific findings. 
From a scientifically informed faith perspective, God's relation to the 
world can be reflected upon and norms for valuing its constituents can be 
discerned. 
This "critical-creative" approach to rethinking notions in the Christian 
tradition and informing them with current scientific findings123 yields an 
understanding of God as willing the universe to exist, sustaining and em-
powering its dynamic self-organization over time and expanding space, 
calling forth the fullest expression of the universe, and valuing its unfolding 
complexity, the diversity of its emerging constituents, and their interacting 
relationships to one another for their common good. The physical world 
can be understood as God's valuable possession, a manifestation of God's 
122
 In Conservation Biology: The Theory and Practice of Nature Conservation, 
Preservation, and Management, ed. Peggy L. Fiedler and Subodh K. Jain (New 
York: Chapman and Hall, 1992), Steward Pickett, Tom Parker, and Peggy Fiedler 
point in to the shifting mosaic of the physical world which is in continuous flux; see 
their "The New paradigm in ecology: Implications for conservation biology above 
the species level." For the authors, "[h]uman-generated changes must be con-
strained because nature has functional, historical, and evolutionary limits." 
123
 This approach is demonstrated in my "Appreciating the Beauty of Earth," 
Theological Studies 62 (2001) 23-52. 
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extravagant goodness, and a readily available subject for discovery. Faith-
filled humans can be understood as discoverers of the physical world's 
value, beholders of its value, and responders to that value124 out of a desire 
to share in God's valuation for the common good of constituents in the 
past, present, and future. 
Application to an Ecological System 
When applied to an ecological system, the effectiveness of this method 
can be demonstrated. Consider, for example, the Everglades, an immense 
fresh water marsh125 that covers 4000 square miles of the southern tip of 
Florida. Called Pa-hay-okee (grassy waters) by the natives because of the 
various species of sedges and grasses that grow in the marsh,126 the Ever-
glades begins as an overflow from Lake Okeechobee in central Florida and 
flows southward and westward until it enters Florida Bay. This slow-
moving mass of water houses a unique composite of ecosystems found 
nowhere else on Earth.127 Among them are mangrove swamps, cypress 
domes, pinelands, marl and coastal prairies, mahogany hammocks, and 
intertidal zones. Within these ecosystems are 600 animal species, 300 spe-
cies of birds, 1000 varieties of plants, and 120 varieties of trees including the 
unique apple pond.128 Since the 1920s, a vast network of ditches and dikes 
have been constructed in millions of acres of the Everglades to control 
floods, and millions more have been drained to create more dry land for 
agri-business and development projects. Only 48 percent of the original 
acreage of the Everglades remains, approximately 90-95 percent of the 
124
 Holmes Rolston III uses this model for humans as "beholders of value" in 
Duties to and Values in Nature (Philadelphia: Temple University) 112-17. See also 
Keekok Lee's affirming discussion in "The Source and Locus of Intrinsic Value: A 
Reexamination," Environmental Ethics 18 (1996) 297-309. 
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 A shallow wetland with few trees and standing water for most of the year. 
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 E.g., Sawgrass (Cladium jamaicense) which grows up to ten feet tall and house 
immense flocks of wading birds, fish, exotic plants, alligators, and numerous inver-
tebrates, which is the dominant grass (actually a sedge) found in the freshwater 
marshes of the Everglades. 
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 Among the informative studies of the Everglades are Steven M. Davis and 
John C. Ogden, Everglades: The Ecosystem and Its Restoration (Delray Beach: St. 
Lucie, 1994); Thomas E. Lodge, The Everglades Handbook: Understanding the 
Ecosystem (Boca Raton: St. Lucie, 1998); Marjory Stoneman Douglas, The Ever-
glades: River of Grass (Sarasota: Pineapple, 1988); Peter Lourie, Everglades: Buf-
falo Tiger and the River of Grass (New York: Boyds Mills, 1994); Diane Raines, 
Water Wars: Drought, Flood, Folly, and the Politics of Thirst (New York: River-
head, 2002); David McCally, The Everglades: An Environmental History (Gaines-
ville: University Press of Florida, 1999); and James P. McMullen, Cry of the Pan-
ther: Quest of a Species (Englewood: Pineapple, 1984). 
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 Lodge, The Everglades Handbook. 
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wading bird population of the Everglades has been lost since the 1930s, 
and 71 species of its natural wildlife are federally listed as endangered or 
threatened, including the American crocodile, the Florida panther,130 the 
Red-cockaded woodpecker, and the Cape Sable seaside sparrow, a song-
bird unique to the Everglades and widely considered to be an indicator of 
the overall health of its habitat.131 The quality of the water has been 
adversely affected by human activities, the most significant of which are 
rock mining and the phosphorus-tainted runoff from sugarcane plantations. 
An explosion of cattail growth and a proliferation of nonnative species 
have displaced native vegetation and destroyed wildlife habitat. To address 
the deterioration of the Everglades, the United States Congress authorized 
a multibillion-dollar restoration plan. Foundations, task forces, and envi-
ronmental defense groups are closely monitoring and participating in this 
planning.132 
The Christian tradition can be drawn upon to motivate believers to join 
others in addressing the dire condition of the Everglades. When thinking 
with Augustine, Chrysostom, and Aquinas about the goodness of creation, 
the waters, grasses, trees, invertebrates,133 plants,134 amphibians,135 fish,136 
mammals,137 the bottoms of the marshes, and the land of the hardwood 
forests can be acknowledged as good and valuable both intrinsically and 
129
 This figure includes seven percent of the egrets, herons, and other wading 
birds that once inhabited the Everglades. 
130
 Perhaps the most famous, elusive, and imperiled resident of the Everglades is 
the Florida panther, a big, tawny cat that is a subspecies of mountain lion; no more 
than 30 to 50 are believed to remain in the wild. 
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 Also the Green turtle, Atlantic Ridley turtle, Atlantic hawksbill turtle, At-
lantic leatherback turtle, Cape Sable seaside sparrow, Everglades Snail Kite, wood 
stork, West Indian manatee, Key Largo wood rat, Key Largo cotton mouse, Schaus 
swallowtail butterfly, and Garber's Spurge. 
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 See, for example, the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, http://  
www.sfrestore.org/, the Everglades Foundation,http://www.saveoureverglades.org/ 
about/about.html, and the Natural Resources Defense Council, http:// 
www. savebiogems. org/ever glades/. 
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 Invertebrates of the Everglades include spiders, scorpions, pond crayfish, a 
plethora of butterflies, dragon flies, grasshoppers, mantids and other insects, ma-
rine invertebrates of many types including many varieties of crabs, sea stars, 
conches, sponges, and snails. 
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 Approximately one hundred and forty exotic, invasive plant species have 
become established within the boundaries of Everglades National Park. With few 
or no natural predators in their new environment, invasive species flourish, replac-
ing natives, and altering the landscape and functioning of the ecosystem. 
135
 Cuban Tree Frog and Southern Leopard Frog. 
136
 Cartilagenous fish include the Southern Stingray; Bony fish include the At-
lantic Needlefish, French Angelfish, Lizardfish, Puffer, and Spotfin Mojarra. 
137
 For example, the common racoon, Florida panther, and manatees. Manatee 
protection efforts were necessary in Florida because people sometimes behaved in 
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instrumentally. They are valuable intrinsically as natural entities that have 
emerged in the Everglades over evolutionary time, having been and con-
tinuing to be shaped by the other constituents of the Everglades, and all 
contribute some essential aspect to the complex Everglades ecological sys-
tem. These constituents are also instrumentally valuable as entities that 
interact with one another in their particular ecological systems for their 
sustenance. For example, the grebe eats the little fish that hide among the 
roots of the water plants that are stirred up by the ibis when digging its bill 
among the roots of the vegetation. The various smaller ecological sys-
tems138 are valuable intrinsically as functioning areas that contribute and 
take from the flowing waters of the Everglades, and they are also instru-
mentally valuable through their use by the Everglades as a whole. The 
sustainability of the Everglades outweighs the good of any one contributing 
ecological system or any one of the system's components, since all are parts 
of the macro Everglades system and essential to sustain its viability. 
Thus, the religious motivation for intrinsic-instrumental valuing of other 
species, abiota, and ecological systems becomes evident when notions 
about the goodness of creation are informed by current scientific findings 
about the physical world. Identifying norms to guide human behavior re-
mains a challenge. 
ETHICS OF INTRINSIC-INSTRUMENTAL VALUING 
A meaningful and potentially effective system of intrinsic-instrumental 
valuing surfaces when foundational notions about the goodness of other 
species, ecological systems, and the biosphere are reworked to reflect our 
current scientific view of the world. Five basic principles flow systemati-
cally for people who believe in God to follow: 
(1) Value the evolutionary process out of which all physical entities, in-
cluding humans, have emerged}39 Empowered by God into existence with 
the ability to develop itself, the physical world has unfolded through an 
interplay of basic laws of physics and chance into a vast diversity of galaxies 
inappropriate ways—pursuing animals in boats, trying to hold or "ride" the ani-
mals, and even sadistically injuring or killing them. 
138
 Mangrove swamps, cypress domes, pinelands, marl and coastal prairies, ma-
hogany hammocks, and intertidal zones. 
139
 In Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual 
Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993) 76, Ronald Dworkin makes an astute 
observation when reflecting on the creativity of the evolutionary process and the 
parallel valuing of species by those who believe in God who can view the evolution 
of species as part of God's authorship of the physical world and by those who 
ascribe to a purely secular view of species as "achievements of adaptation" over 
long and complex periods of time. From both perspectives, to cause a species 
extinction is a "frustration" of "investments" that are "worthy of respect." 
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with billions of stars, other cosmic phenomenon, and planets. At least one 
planet has a diversity of biological life, including reflective beings with the 
capacity to discover value and demonstrate their valuations. Having 
emerged from and with other entities through this cosmological-biological 
process, humans should value it by functioning constructively within it so 
the process can continue to produce more valuable entities.140 Humans can 
also value the process instrumentally as the conduit through which the 
necessities of life have emerged and facilitated the flourishing of species. 
Because there are functional, historical, and evolutionary limits to the 
physical world, humans will strive to know those limits and live within 
them.141 By cooperating with other species, abiota, ecological systems, and 
the biosphere, humans will be cooperating with God's gratuitous and lov-
ing empowerment of that creative process. 
(2) Discover and value the innate goodness of the various species and 
other natural entities, their interests, and their needs to survive in the world. 
With Augustine, Chrysostom, and Aquinas, people who profess faith in 
God will discover the intrinsic value of each species, the air, land, and 
water, and they will demonstrate their valuation accordingly. In addition to 
homo sapiens, all other species will be valued in themselves as entities that 
have emerged with humans over time and space. Integral to discovering 
their value is the need to discern their interests in surviving and needs for 
surviving. Interference with these needs and interests will be avoided lo-
cally to globally. Species' habitats will be protected, and lists of threatened 
and endangered species will diminish. Efforts will be expended to curtail 
pollutants and persistent toxicants from the air, water, and land. 
(3) Discover and value the instrumental relationship of innately good 
beings to one another. While intrinsically valuable, the instrumental value 
140
 Holmes Rolston III explains: "There is a kind of 'promise' in nature not only 
in the sense of potential that is promising but in the reliability in the earthen set-up 
that is right for life. Perhaps the planetary set-up is an accident, but the ongoing 
after the set-up seems to be loaded with fertility . . . . It seems a shame now for 
humans to break that 'promise.'" ("Disvalues in Nature," The Monist 75 (1992) 
250-80). See further, John F. Haught, The Promise of Nature: Ecology and Cosmic 
Purpose (New York: Paulist, 1993). J. Baird Callicott explores the continuity of the 
human self and nature and insists that nature is intrinsically valuable if "the self is 
intrinsically valuable." He reasons further: "If it is rational for me to act in my own 
best interests, and I and nature are one, then it is rational for me to act in the best 
interests of nature" ("Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Eth-
ics" 275). 
i4i j n «The N e w paradigm in Ecology," Pickett, Parker and Fiedler point to the 
shifting mosaic of the physical world which is in continuous flux. "Human-
generated changes must be constrained because nature has functional, historical, 
and evolutionary limits. Nature has a range of ways to be, but there is a limit to 
those ways, and therefore, human changes must be within those limits." 
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of species, air, land, and water to one another will also be discerned and 
valued by people who believe in God as the creator, sustainer, and ultimate 
valuer of the physical world. Land species use air, water, land, and other 
species to maintain themselves, marine species use water and select species 
of food to maintain themselves, and airborne species rely on water, land, 
and other species to sustain themselves. Humans use individuals of other 
species for food and other goods needed for their lives and well-being, 
though too many humans in economically developed nations use other 
biota, abiota, and whole ecological systems to try to satisfy their insatiable 
desires. Instead of thinking about other species, air, land, and water exclu-
sively from the perspective of their usefulness to humans, faith-filled people 
will recognize and value the use that other species have for one another, 
the air, land, and water for their sustenance in the complex web of life. 
(4) Discover and value the unique contribution that each species, air, 
land, and water makes to their shared ecological systems. Following Augus-
tine, Chrysostom, Aquinas, and other eminent theologians, people who 
profess faith in God will discover and acknowledge the contributions that 
species and abiota make to their shared ecological systems. They will be 
valued as God's creatures that are valued by God for their contributions to 
the integrity of ecological systems. Actions that inhibit their contributions 
will be prevented. Proposed projects will be scrutinized to assure that each 
constituent can continue to contribute. 
(5) Discover and value the functioning of ecological systems and the 
biosphere to achieve their common good—their sustainability—now and 
into the future. In addition to valuing the contributions that constituents 
make to their shared ecological systems, the overall functioning of these 
systems should be valued both intrinsically and instrumentally. The com-
bination of the complex interactions of biota and abiota that create and 
recreate an ecological system142 should be discovered and sufficiently val-
ued intrinsically by controlling human actions so they avoid disrupting a 
system's natural functioning and, thereby, deter it from achieving its com-
mon good. So, too, will people value the functioning of Earth's interactive 
constituents as the best manifestation of God's goodness, as Aquinas taught. 
In light of the fact that humans rely upon the land, air, waters, and other 
species for human well-being and that humans function as integral but 
often degrading constituents of those systems, people who profess faith in 
God will instrumentally value the systems in which they live by taking from 
them only what is needed to sustain their lives in ways and doing so in ways 
that avoid endangering the system's sustainability. With Aldo Leopold, 
142
 See David Lodge, "From the Balance to the Flux of Nature: The Power of 
Metaphor in Cross-Discipline Conversations," Worldviews: Environment, Culture, 
Religion 7 (2003) 1-4. 
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faith-filled people will think about themselves as citizens of ecological 
systems rather than conquerors of them.143 Faith-filled people will be in-
spired by the shared thinking of Augustine, Aquinas, and other theologians 
about the sacramentality of creation so as to value the functional integrity 
of ecological systems and the biosphere as the best manifestation of God's 
goodness. They will also be inspired by theologians' thinking about the 
instrumental use of creation as human means through which they can learn 
more about God's attributes. 
Following this principle, the sustainability of Earth will become the chief 
organizing principle around which moral decisions will be made. This prin-
ciple is, as Longwood insists, the best framework for addressing the ongo-
ing degradation of Earth.144 The principle of Earth's sustainability is also 
conducive to the "cosmological-ecological principle" that French identifies 
from Aquinas's works.145 And, it is the "fertile ground" that should satisfy 
Kavanaugh for assuring that valuing other-than-humans is not merely for 
human benefit.146 With Tanner, people who believe in God as the creator 
and sustainer of the world will "repudiate any such alternative between 
concerns for environmental well-being, on the one hand, and sensitivity to 
issues of human justice, on the other."147 All actions will be adjudicated on 
143
 Aldo Leopold, Sand County Almanac: With Essays on Conservation from 
Round River (New York: Ballantine, 1949) 203-4. 
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ecology on the other" ("The Common Good: An Ethical Framework for Evaluat-
ing Environmental Issues" 479-80). 
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 French, "Catholicism and the Common Good of the Biosphere" 192. 
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 Kavanaugh explains that Aquinas's "metaphysics and anthropology provide 
ground fertile enough for raising stewardship as an ethical issue" ("Intrinsic Value, 
Persons and Stewardship" 67). He offers "a contemporary account of Aquinas's 
'intrinsic value' theory as a nominee for the foundation upon which the issue of 
stewardship can be based." This approach "recognizes an intrinsic goodness and 
value to every existing being, regardless of its role as a function of our happiness or 
motives. The 'intrinsic value' approach . . . stresses that there are certain actions 
which, no matter what the external factors or the internal motives, are somehow 
profoundly evil in themselves, independent of their usefulness or our intentions." 
147
 Katherine Tanner argues: "Putting human and non human beings together in 
this way within a single community of moral concern helps resolve certain issues for 
human decision making." She encourages people who believe in God as Creator "to 
explore ways in which human action might alter circumstances of competition and 
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the basis of the shared common good of the constituents of ecological 
systems and the biosphere to sustain themselves. All conflicts would be 
settled on the basis of the extent to which the claim seeks the necessities 
that sustain the claimant's existence so the claimant can continue to con-
tribute to the internal functioning of an ecological system and the greater 
biosphere. Needs will always take precedence over wants in moral deci-
sion-making.148 A vision of the future informed by the present will be 
essential to making prudent decisions at all levels of human society.149 
CONCLUSION 
The ethics of intrinsic-instrumental valuing based on reformulated pa-
tristic and medieval notions about the goodness of creation provides a 
meaningful, relevant, realistic, and potentially effective system of environ-
mental ethics. It is readily available for application today by people who 
profess faith in God as the creator and sustainer of the world and who 
believe that humans are responsible to God for how they act in this world. 
From this religious faith perspective, difficult issues with which secular 
philosophers have been grappling can be addressed. Other-than-humans 
are valuable intrinsically as well as instrumentally as they struggle to sus-
tain their shared existence with humans. The intrinsic value of other-than-
humans originates with God who empowers the evolutionary process out 
of which all entities emerge. Their intrinsic-instrumental value persists in 
this process, and their value is discoverable by humans who have the ability 
to discern and demonstrate their valuations. Finally, a system of ethics 
based on the common good—the sustainability of all constituents in their 
shared ecological systems and the greater biosphere—serves to adjudicate 
conflicts among valued beings. 
Five initial principles flow from reworked notions about the goodness of 
the physical world. People who profess faith in God should value the 
bring the earth closer to a vision of a truly universal, world-inclusive, equal justice" 
("Creation, Environmental Crisis, and Ecological Justice," in Reconstructing Chris-
tian Theology, ed. Rebecca S. Chopp and Mark Lewis Taylor [Minneapolis: For-
tress, 1994] 99-123, at 120). 
148
 J. Baird Callicott argues that the holistic land ethic is not a case of ecofascism 
but, instead, tends to supplement, not replace, the more venerable community-
based social ethics: "When holistic environment-oriented duties are in conflict with 
individualistic human-oriented duties, and the holistic environmental interests at 
issue are significantly stronger than the individualistic human interests at issue, the 
former take priority" (Beyond the Land Ethic 76). For a full explanation, see his 
chapter 4, "Holistic Environmental Ethics and the Problem of Ecofascism" 59-76. 
149
 A detailed discussion of prudent environmental decision-making can be 
found in my "The Virtuous Cooperator" (see above n. 35). 
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process out of which all entities have emerged. They should also discover 
and value the innate goodness of the various species and other natural 
entities, their interests and their needs to survive in the world, their instru-
mental relationship to one another, and the unique contributions they 
make to their shared ecological systems. And, faith-filled people should 
value the functioning of ecological systems and the biosphere to achieve 
their common good—their sustainability—now and in the future. Attention 
to these principles drawn from the Christian theological tradition should 
aid in restraining the ongoing degradation of Earth. 
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